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In the midst of the Iraq war, Joseph Lane observed: ‘Whenever we get a new war, we get a new Thucydides’ (2005, 54). Lane’s remark echoed Robert Connor’s suggestion nearly thirty years earlier that Vietnam had brought into being a post-modern Thucydides, whose artistry, intensity, and emotional involvement departed radically from the objective, rationalist, and scientific Thucydides of the early Cold War (1977). As Lane and Connor recognize, reading Thucydides in wartime has become a ritual of sorts. The twentieth century alone has witnessed a veritable procession of scholars and public figures drawn into Thucydides’ orbit by the political crises of their own time.​[1]​ More remarkable still is the conviction that Thucydides, hardly a popular figure, has important lessons to impart to democratic publics, or that a war fought more than two thousand years ago can mean something to citizens of a modern liberal democracy. For many of the books on Thucydides are meant for the general public rather than narrow specialists.  These works jointly presume that the history of the Peloponnesian War needs to be retold and that there are profound stakes in the retelling.​[2]​ 
The overtly political quality of wartime readings of Thucydides over the last century is, for this reason, notable. That the challenges of war and peace have precipitated a rich reception history of Thucydides also explains why wartime engagements evince recurring themes. One especially prominent motif in twentieth-century Anglo-American readings is that of democratic statecraft. Anxieties about democratic performance abound, as commentators wrestle with the vagaries of democratic politics and their consequences for foreign policy. Thucydides seems to speak directly to modern misgivings, of which Michael Palmer offers an especially forthright articulation: ‘How can democracies successfully retain concepts of political legitimacy on which they are based and at the same time garner and maintain the will to act assertively in the international arena? How can they avoid falling into the self-destructive isolationism that is “the dangerous result of endless self-criticism and self-denigration?” ’​[3]​ These questions and the democratic liabilities they presuppose have led many back to Thucydides’ critical account of Athenian democracy.​[4]​
Indeed, Thucydides has been deployed throughout the twentieth century as a critic of democratic imprudence in wartime. It is striking how often readers have treated Thucydides as an unproblematic mouthpiece for anti-democratic sentiments. G.F. Abbott, reflecting on the History in the aftermath of World War I, called Athenian democracy a ‘childish experiment [whose] sole value for posterity is that of a warning.’ Nowhere, he insisted, ‘have national interests been treated with the fury which shuts its eyes to consequences completely; for nowhere did the constitution place the state at the mercy of orators whose presumptuous ignorance and insolent passion could only advise desperate extremities’ (1925: 137, 147). During the Cold War, Peter Fliess read the History as a forceful indictment of the ‘deficiencies of the democratic constitution’ and its fatal consequences for leadership, stability, and cohesion (1959: 618). Louis Halle blamed Athens’ fate on the ‘tyranny of the common mind,’ ‘the rule of the Demos which led it over the brink of disaster’ (1980: 628). These evaluations, characterized by a shared skepticism about democracy, deem it too irresolute, erratic, factional, and extremist to produce what prudent statecraft requires. One would be hard-pressed not to presume that the implicit lesson for modern democracies is that they need to be less democratic, at least when in the throes of war.
The general tenor of these wartime readings of the History accords with the practice, common until the nineteenth century, of treating Thucydides as an anti-democratic authority.​[5]​ Prominent thinkers in nineteenth-century Britain like George Grote and John Stuart Mill moved against the grain when they offered sanguine visions of classical democracy. In the context of contentious debates over British democratization, they resurrected Athenian democracy as a political and cultural system worthy of emulation (Potter 2012, Cartledge 1994). Contemporary interpreters of classical antiquity concerned with modern democracy at war may have different political preoccupations, but like their nineteenth-century predecessors, many redeem from the History a democratic exceptionalism Thucydides never meant to authorize. 
This article focuses on the Thucydidean engagements of two high-profile American scholars, Donald Kagan and Victor Davis Hanson. As readers of Thucydides and cultural authorities on ancient Greece, they deserve special attention for two reasons. The first is simply that they are the most influential and well-known. Kagan and Hanson both have reputations as outspoken public intellectuals, able scholars, and dedicated teachers. While their neoconservative commitments make them controversial, their scholarly works have nevertheless garnered high praise.​[6]​ So too have their recent accounts of the Peloponnesian War, which are undoubtedly the most popular and widely-read histories of the war amongst the general public.​[7]​ As cultural conservatives, both are ardent defenders of Western civilization and see education in the classics and ancient history as an integral part of that defense.​[8]​ These facts make Kagan and Hanson obvious candidates for classical reception, given its constitutive focus on how classical antiquity is interpreted and reworked in later historical, political, and cultural contexts.
The second reason for focusing on Kagan and Hanson is that they are in some ways exemplary readers and representative political thinkers. This may seem like a strange claim to make given their neoconservative attachments. Although my analysis suggests the impossibility of divorcing their politics from their historical scholarship, I do not approach Kagan and Hanson from the lens of neoconservatism. Doing so risks activating the partisan identifications that lead one to endorse or dismiss them prematurely. It also risks eliding how they are paradigmatic in ways that contribute to our understanding of democracy and its discontents as well as the complex politics surrounding contemporary engagements with classical antiquity.
	Kagan and Hanson are exemplary in at least two ways. First, their works exhibit how persistent theoretical concerns about democracy shape the reception of Thucydides in times of crisis. Both offer interpretive histories of the Peloponnesian War attuned to prevalent anxieties about how democracies perform in wartime, whether they are as prudent and effective as their authoritarian foes, and whether they can avert complacency in times of peace. Their readings reflect enduring anxieties about democratic statecraft prefigured by liberals and conservatives throughout the twentieth century. This preoccupation with democratic survival transcends disciplinary boundaries and can be discerned inside and outside the academy.​[9]​
At the same time, Kagan and Hanson depict hopeful visions of Athenian democracy common to earlier receptions of ancient Greece, though also uniquely resonant with popular judgments about democracy in the post-Cold War period.​[10]​ As the final section of this article points out, analogous forms of democratic exceptionalism are prominent in leftist interpretations of ancient Greece and post-Cold war empirical political science. A reception framework thus reveals significant patterns across disciplinary and sub-disciplinary boundaries. The fact that works in ancient history and political science manifest common concerns and shared judgments about democracy is suggestive. At a minimum, it should spur dialogue on how broader political context affects our scholarly preoccupations and what this means for our theoretical commitments and substantive conclusions.​[11]​ 
The analysis that follows constitutes a demonstration and an argument. And that argument is that reception studies offer us more than a catalogue of readings of a particular text. Rather than surveying the reception history of Thucydides or the ancient Greeks, I adopt a narrower focus. I show how approaching Kagan and Hanson with the rigor usually only granted to canonical texts is consequential for democratic political thought and action. It also has implications for the dialectic between classical antiquity, on the one hand, and contemporary scholarship and political discourse on the other. 
	With regard to democracy, Kagan and Hanson provide the occasion for thinking through perennial concerns about its foundations, promises, and problems. They also provoke a crucial question: How do we think about democracy and its challenges when there are no legitimate alternatives? Kagan’s and Hanson’s reception of Thucydides demonstrates how an elitist ancient historian is leveraged to address the shortcomings of democratic politics at a historical moment in which democracy, however defined, is the only game in town. They seek to recover Athenian democracy for modern liberals, but in so doing unwittingly reveal the intimate and problematic link between democratic exceptionalism and democratic anxiety. This article engages in close analysis of their pre- and post-9/11 interpretations of Thucydides in order to clarify this connection. I show that when there are no viable alternatives to democracy, democratic criticism can take the shape of democratic exceptionalism. 
This democratic exceptionalism is performative and pedagogical. Kagan and Hanson use the History to defend democracy, but in ways that are at odds with their implicit criticisms of democratic politics. We can make sense of this tension by appreciating the performative dimension of their readings of Thucydides. Beyond distilling Thucydides for a general audience, their readings enact a response to concerns about democratic weakness with an account of democratic virtues. Any critical evaluation must consider the substantive claims made about democracy as well as whether exceptionalism is a sufficient and effective response to democracy’s putative ailments. In this vein, I argue that Kagan’s and Hanson’s hermeneutic strategies are implicated in rhetorical politics that may have deleterious, if unintended, consequences for the democracy they seek to defend. 
Put differently, my analysis has substantive and theoretical payoffs, and they are mutually reinforcing. Substantively, the reception approach deployed here lays out for critical consideration a popular diagnosis of and prescription for democracy’s definitive problems. Theoretically, reception calls us to adopt a reflective posture that holds dual awareness of the claims we make as scholars and how such claims function as political argument and education. Reception clarifies the ways in which interpreters engage in mimicry, echoing the speech patterns and sensibilities of classical authors and their characters. This is important for normative and critical reasons, and yields substantive insights as well. Here, for instance, I reveal how democratic exceptionalism is itself a source – rather than mere account or disinterested description – of democratic power. If, as education and performative utterance, democratic exceptionalism is a problematic form of political action, then this has bearing on a broad range of scholarship and on how modern democracy conceptualizes itself.​[12]​
To recapitulate, a systematic consideration of how Thucydides has been read by Kagan and Hanson can spotlight major preoccupations in contemporary politics and difficult tensions within democratic discourse, which may have policy import. With regard to scholarship, using Thucydidean reception to unearth salient political concerns constitutes the first step towards discerning and evaluating common patterns in ostensibly very different disciplinary enterprises. This study thus strives to exemplify how reception might function as a critical and constructive interlocutor for contemporary endeavors in ancient history, political theory, and political science. Finally, by drawing attention to how prominent thinkers have figured the relationship between classical antiquity and the present, my analysis raises the question of how we might do so in more fruitful ways.
	
II. In Defense of Democracy
Kagan’s and Hanson’s attempts to make the history of ancient Greece speak to contemporary politics have elicited apprehensive responses. Critics have voiced concern over how their accounts of the Peloponnesian War legitimate an aggressive and expansionist American foreign policy. They have focused less on their respective appraisals of democracy.​[13]​ Perhaps this is because their preoccupation with American preeminence and military performance marks them as obvious anti-democrats. Their political commentaries, simultaneously critical and admiring of liberal democracy, suggest a mixed review. Their historical scholarship does as well, but what calls for particular consideration is the fact that both go to great lengths to read the History against Thucydides’ aristocratic biases. In this section, I want to examine how Kagan and Hanson use the History to build a case for democracy in wartime.
Kagan’s most recent work, Thucydides: The Reinvention of History, his second post-9/11 book on Thucydides, is largely a distillation of his previous scholarship for the general public.​[14]​ It is also a systematically crafted defense of Athenian democracy against Thucydides’ indictment of post-Periclean Athens. Calling Thucydides a ‘revisionist,’ Kagan is keen to locate the fissures between the facts Thucydides presents and his interpretations of them. He questions the latter’s judgments about the inevitability of the war and its fatal outcome, construing them as part of a rigorous attempt to deflect from Pericles’ responsibility for starting the war without a viable strategy for winning it.​[15]​ 
Thucydides, Kagan reminds us, was ‘a nobleman contemptuous of democracy’; he believed that Athens’ spectacular defeat was the consequence of ‘a democracy run riot,’ one without a ‘remarkable statesman’ like Pericles to moderate its intrinsic excesses (2009: 225-6). The History envisions the demos as a ‘foolish and fickle democratic mob, swayed now by hope and now by fear, [a] victim of its passions, lacking wisdom, restraint, and character’ (1988: 47). Thucydides showcases insatiable avarice, an endless parade of democratic extremism and vacillation. The reader follows glumly along as Athens marches to the unremitting beat set by her richly deserved demagogues, straight to her doom.
Thucydides’ unflattering image of democracy is softened in The Reinvention of History, as is his distinction between the nominal democracy of Periclean Athens and the demagogic excesses of the post-Periclean period. Against Thucydides’ sharp narrative arc of decline and disintegration, Kagan establishes strategic calculation as the throughline that ties one event to the next. Pre-war Athens is depicted as a model of self-restraint, free from bellicose intentions and imperial aspirations. She is eminently – and characteristically - capable of self-control and strategic foresight.​[16]​ Kagan’s post-Periclean Athens similarly departs from Thucydides’ reckless imperial democracy given over completely to the reign of petty and ambitious demagogues. The more assertive orientation of post-Periclean Athens is a sign of democratic prudence, Athens’ characteristic commitment to strategic decision-making, rather than the unfortunate consequence of democracy left to its own devices. The bolder approach of those like Eurymedon, Demosthenes, and Cleon is what enables Athens to finance and continue the war for nearly three decades.​[17]​ 
Kagan’s re-reading of key events throughout the History helps sustain this image of enduring democratic prudence. It does so, firstly, by providing the missing strategic underpinnings and rational justification for what Thucydides presents as counterproductive, myopic, thoughtless, or otherwise arbitrary. Secondly, it foregrounds the democratic, namely deliberative, basis of decision-making. Thucydides, Kagan observes, systematically omits the context and panoply of speeches given in assembly deliberations. By inserting speculative accounts of these unreported discussions into Thucydides’ narrative, Kagan invites a reappraisal of the nature of Athenian decision-making. This can be seen in his account of two watershed events in the post-Periclean period: Athens’ rejection of the Spartan peace bid in 425 BC and the infamous Sicilian Expedition launched ten years later.
Thucydides describes Athens’ rejection of the Spartan peace offer as a consequence of overconfidence, avarice, and the devastatingly influential rhetorical antics of Cleon (IV.21.2-3). He highlights how Cleon violently sabotages an opportunity for negotiated peace. Kagan, alternatively, crafts rational foundations for Cleon’s alleged intemperance. A peace based on the precariousness of Spartan intentions rather than its capacity to make war, he appraises in an authorial voice, would be an illusory peace at best (2009: 126-130). Moreover, the Athenian assembly must have discussed the Spartan overture, and it is Thucydides’ failure to document and situate Cleon’s opinions in the context of that deliberation that gives the impression that he ‘stands alone among the Athenians as a reckless and ridiculous extremist’ (2009:128).​[18]​
The assembly meeting held in the summer of 425, which led to Cleon’s unexpected victory in Pylos, is similarly contextualized. Thucydides does not say why the assembly was convened or what was said there beyond recounting the absurdity of Cleon’s boast to bring back the Spartans trapped on the island of Spachteria within twenty days. Kagan offers his own hypothesis: the meeting was convened to debate Demosthenes’ request for reinforcements in preparation for an assault on the island, which Cleon presumably defended against a reluctant Nicias. The Athenians agreed to send reinforcements commanded by Nicias, at which point the assembly taunted Cleon to take up the task given how undemanding he took the operation to be. Since Cleon was undoubtedly in contact with Demosthenes and therefore aware of his intention to use light-armed troops, his bluff was no bluff at all (2009: 133-134). It was an example of clear-sighted strategic brilliance, part and parcel of a larger deliberative context.​[19]​
Kagan’s reading of the Sicilian Expedition follows the same pattern, establishing its strategic rationale and democratic foundations.​[20]​ Perhaps the most potent symbol of democratic dysfunction and mob rule in the History, the Sicilian Expedition is recast as a strategically sound enterprise that originally began with limited aims. In Kagan’s view, its disastrous inflation and outcome owe themselves to Nicias’ failed rhetorical gambit to frighten the Athenians into aborting the mission. His strategic incompetence, rather than Alcibiades’ hopeful ambitions or Athenian greed, proves decisive. Kagan disputes Thucydides’ presentation of an ignorant and overly exuberant mob excited by the prospect of conquest. At least 5,000 Athenians knew its geography and population well, he deduces, and the fact that the Athenians voted to send envoys to verify Segestan claims about the supposed wealth that would pay for the expedition indicates both Athenian shrewdness and extensive deliberation, despite their being taken in (2009: 168-169; 2003: 251-261, 322). 
To argue for the prudence and efficacy of post-Periclean Athenian democracy is to do more than reappraise individual characters. It is, more significantly, to defend their decision-making and its democratic character. The point is not just that Cleon and Alcibiades were more prudent than Thucydides gave them credit for, but also that they were speaking with and for the demos rather than manipulating it. Kagan’s narrative suggests that strategic acumen and good judgment inhere in Athenian democracy rather than any of its particular leaders. Thucydides, convinced that democracy could not engender these constituents of political success, imagined a decisive gulf between the nominal democracy of Pericles and the ‘degenerate post-Periclean democracy’ that followed in his wake (2009: 114). While Thucydides underscores the fatal consequences brought about by feckless demagogues wagging the rabid dog of the Athenian demos, Kagan blurs the distinction between Pericles and his successors. If we are tempted to attribute responsibility for particularly egregious decisions to individual leaders, his characterizations make it difficult to do so. Cleon may have been advocating brutality in the Mytilenean debate, and Alcibiades may have had personal ambitions in Sicily, but both were essentially adhering to Periclean rhetoric and logic.​[21]​ From pre-war Athens to Sicily, the nature of Athenian decision-making is more or less constant in Kagan’s reading. Its orientation shifts, but the prudential ethos that governs Athenian deliberation does not. If Thucydides ‘reinvents’ history to defend Pericles, Kagan – in Thucydidean fashion - reworks the History to defend Athenian democracy.​[22]​
Just as Kagan reads the History against Thucydides’ criticisms of democratic judgment in wartime, Hanson appropriates the History to challenge its own suggestions that democratic rule undermined Athens’ prosecution of the war, guaranteeing its military and political defeat.  Hanson’s own use of Thucydides against domestic critics of the war on terrorism has unabashedly traded on such anti-democratic barbs.​[23]​ Yet the anti-democratic Thucydides neither exhausts nor maps perfectly onto Hanson’s own views. Rather than using Thucydides to confirm democracy’s permanent faults in wartime, Hanson uses the ancient historian to defend democracy against critics who insist on its relative disadvantages vis-a-vis authoritarian foes. While Kagan employs Thucydides to establish democratic prudence, Hanson turns to Thucydides in service of a broader argument about the historical legacy of ancient Greece and the unbroken thread connecting ancient and modern democracy. The foundational claim of this historical project is that of democratic efficacy, or democracy’s ability to deploy power effectively in warfare.
In his 2001 book, Why the West has Won: Carnage and Culture from Salamis to Vietnam, Hanson put forth a cultural explanation for Western military superiority.  Although this case for Western preeminence was made before 9/11, the argument struck a chord in the post-9/11 environment and has been the context of many of his deployments of Thucydides since. In this work, Hanson’s essential claim is that a Western way of war characterized by military exceptionalism connects ancient Greece to modern Europe and America. This preeminence is taken to be the necessary culmination of Western values, namely economic rationalism, ‘freedom, individualism, and civic militarism,’ rather than the sole consequence of technological superiority. (2001c: 21).​[24]​
Hanson’s original argument is more cultural than political. It treats ancient Greece as a monolithic entity, even misappropriating one of Brasidas’ speeches to sustain a contrast between the constitutional and consensual governments of the Greek city-states and the barbarian others.​[25]​ In subsequent versions, where Thucydides’ History plays a more prominent role, Athens becomes more significant, as do its decisive political differences from a less efficacious, oligarchic Sparta.  Hanson homes in on the unique role fifth-century democratic Athens played in expanding the domain and transforming the technology of warfare, radically altering its character and methodology. In this process, battles between hoplite phalanxes were replaced by practices – siegecraft, fortification, organized navies – that proved exponentially more flexible, lethal, and efficacious. Embedding Thucydides within this broader consideration of ancient military practices, Hanson uses the History to examine ‘how democracies conduct themselves in war – and why they often win.’ The effect is more than a celebration of Athenian prowess or resilience, its ‘extraordinary success in creating and maintaining a maritime empire for much of the fifth century’ or, as he is eager to point out, its rebound in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War (2001a: 4, 17). These technical and tactical details of warfare form the nuts and bolts of a normative defense of democracy.
The birth of a revolutionary kind of military preeminence, Hanson contends, was a ‘logical manifestation of democracy’ (2001a: 9). More specifically, it was the fruit of democratic institutions and values rather than its companion features, whether imperialism or the contingent leadership of a Themistocles or Pericles. In this so-called Athenian military renaissance, Hanson places particular stress on the transparency and freedom of liberal societies, the democratic commitment to egalitarianism that privileged achievement rather than social position, and collective deliberation over military enterprises, which generated a powerful sense of cohesion. Put more bluntly, Athenian military excellence owed itself to democratic virtue. Consider how these virtues are implicated in Hanson’s military profile of Athens and the Peloponnesian league: 
The military antithesis of a democratic state… would have a large hoplite army (Thuc. 1.121.3; 1.143.5), fight in pitched battles (Thuc. 5.41.2-3), see strategy as largely agricultural devastation (Thuc. 1.143.5; 2.10.3-5), and neglect both siegecraft and fortification in the expectation that opponents would do likewise (Thuc. 1.90.1-3). Its army would be organized along strict census rubrics, and be largely amateur (Thuc. 4.94.1-3); indeed, there might be little if any capital on hand in the city’s coffers (Thuc. 1.141.3), if coffers even existed… Navies would be small, if not nonexistent (Thuc. 1.142.6-9). In other words, military efficacy would be less important than the social and political exclusivity of hoplite landowners (2001a: 18).
Even without Hanson’s condemnation of what he refers to in A War Like No Other as ‘hoplite chauvinism,’ the significance of the juxtaposition is clear. Military effectiveness reflects the normative worth of a society’s regime and political commitments, and for Hanson it is the consequence and confirmation of democratic exceptionalism. It is this historical account of democratic efficacy that informs Hanson’s praise for Athenian resilience, his rhetorical intimations that perhaps Athens did not actually lose, and his invocations of Thucydidean praise for Syracuse’s performance in the war, whose comparison to Athens he interprets as evidence of the intimate connection between democracy and military prowess (2005: 289-294).

III. Democratic Pessimism and Democratic Exceptionalism
The democratic confidence in Kagan’s and Hanson’s readings of the History is not quite what it seems. Both express views conspicuously at odds with their respective arguments for democratic prudence and democratic efficacy. Discernable in their historical scholarship and political commentary is a much more pessimistic view of democracy. This pessimism marks even Kagan’s most laudatory account of Athenian democracy, his encomium to Pericles at the end of the Cold War, entitled Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy. ​[26]​ There, admiring reveries give way to cautionary meditations, and the result is a resounding note of ambivalence. 
While Kagan pits himself against ancient and modern critics of democracy, his own appraisal owes something to their concerns about democratic survival and weakness. For all his efforts to defend the demos against Thucydides, Kagan occasionally lets slip a less flattering view of Athens. Democracies, he acknowledges, are challenged precisely because of their constitutional practices. The lesson of Athens, Kagan posits, may be that ‘democracies, where everything must be debated in the open and relatively uninformed majorities persuaded, may find it harder to adjust to the necessities of war than other, less open societies’ (1987: 416). Kagan applauds Athenian democracy for voting to constrain, suspend, and limit itself (1987: 4-5; 1990: 282; 2003: 329, 366). And although he stands by the democratic realities of Periclean Athens, he nonetheless stresses Pericles’ ‘effective political control’ and the need for able leadership. Chief amongst the requisite abilities of democratic statesmen is ‘to know what must be done and to be able to explain it’ (1990: xiii, 9; 2003: 97-98). Without this firm, clear-sighted Periclean leadership, Athenian democracy ‘stumbled aimlessly into destructive brutality and self-destructive adventurism’ (1990: 281). This more blistering take on the Melian atrocity and Sicilian Expedition hews closer to Thucydides. It also puts into question Kagan’s confidence in an authentic, rather than merely nominal, democratic prudence.​[27]​
A more chastened view of modern democracy accompanies this darker view of Athens. Despite a historical trajectory that seems to vindicate liberal democracy, Kagan’s book on Pericles begins with an acknowledgement of democratic vulnerability and an outline of the demanding requirements for political success. It is manifestly preoccupied with democratic survival, both of established democracies and of fledglings in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Against optimistic complacency, Kagan emphasizes the rarity and fragility of democracy (1990: 2).
	Modern liberal democracies face unique hardships, and this truth is a persistent motif in Kagan’s scholarship on modern warfare. If there is one decisive problem with democracy, it is the lack of resolve in both times of war and peace. Resolve is the linchpin of Kagan’s account of the Peloponnesian War, both World Wars, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in his tome, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. It is also what he finds in short supply in the West’s most affluent liberal democracies in the post-Cold War period. Kagan has long registered this spiritual abdication with alarm, censuring modern liberal democracy’s tendency to slide into isolationalism, complacency, ‘disarmament, withdrawal, and disengagement,’ its inability to rally the ‘spiritual resources’ needed to renew its ‘commitment to the active preservation of peace’ (1995: 572-573). This appraisal is highly critical of modern liberal democracy’s proclivities, particularly what Kagan variously refers to as the cult of the defensive, the modern appeasement mentality, an unwillingness to wield power, and a congenital blindness to the need for active and sustained defense even in peacetime (1990: 100, 113, 227). Kagan is emphatic: prudence demands more than ‘preponderant power.’ Perceptions matter, and nothing makes power diminish in the eyes of an adversary more than a ‘perceived lack of will.’ Even if material power is constant, Kagan argues, lack of resolve leads to lack of respect, with real effects on the distribution of power (1995: 8). Modern liberal democracies do not fully appreciate just how precarious power is and therefore underestimate the resolve needed to exercise prudent statecraft. 
What are the roots of this democratic irresolution, and how should we figure the relationship between Kagan’s critical view of modern democracy and his sanguine account of Athenian democracy, including his conspicuous praise of Pericles’ democratic exceptionalism? Democracy’s unique challenges arise from its foundational commitments. Unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies cannot rely on violence or coercion to compel behavior necessary for political success. From the starting point of freedom emerges a forked road, one leading to a lush landscape of human flourishing, the other to a desiccated wasteland of atomism and disintegration. The distinction between Athens and Sparta helps clarify and solidify our hold on the problem. As Kagan puts it, 
Pericles confronted the problem that faces any free and democratic society: How can the citizens be persuaded to make the sacrifices necessary for its success? Tyrants and dictators can rely on mercenaries and compulsion to defend their states. Rare states like Sparta – a closed authoritarian society – could inculcate in their people a willingness to renounce their private lives almost entirely. But democracies cannot use such devices (1990: 7). 
Kagan articulates a common concern about democratic regimes vis-à-vis their authoritarian counterparts, namely that the latter can readily mobilize citizens and resources for defense without consent. Without resorting coercion, democracies must find alternative sources of cohesion, compelling reasons for citizens to sacrifice life and property for a common good that may seem elusive. Necessity and justice are always contestable, and dissent and opposition ought not be confused with an abdication of common cause and responsibility. Still, the Athenian dissatisfaction with Pericles in response to waning fortunes and physical suffering suggests the genuine difficulty of sustaining war and the challenge of providing a cogent and durable response to the citizen’s rightful question: ‘Why should I risk my life for my city’ (1990: 148)? 
This permanent tension between private and public sheds some light on why Kagan’s account of the Peloponnesian War tends to treat democratic Athens as a corporate whole. More obviously, it explains his glowing account of Periclean leadership, notwithstanding his critique of the latter’s war strategy. It explains his claim that democratic survival ‘requires extraordinary leadership’, despite his rebuke of Thucydidean elitism (1990: 9). In his book on Pericles, Kagan moves straight from a diagnosis of democratic disadvantage to an exegesis of the Funeral Oration. A striking performance of democratic leadership, this speech constitutes a public education. Here is Kagan on what is decisive about this democratic pedagogy:
Pericles sought to teach the Athenians that their own interests were inextricably tied together with those of their community, that they could not be secure and prosper unless their state was secure and prosperous, that the ordinary man could achieve greatness only through the greatness of his society….Pericles tried to shape a new society and a new kind of citizen, not by the use of force or terror but by the power of his ideas (1990: 7).
In short, Pericles forges a connection between individual and community, negotiating the democratic tension between freedom and equality. For Kagan, the Funeral Oration provides a solution to the centrifugal tendencies of democracy. In Pericles’ tapestry of the Athenian way of life, even the poorest citizen can see his service to the political community as part of a collective striving for glory. He offers democratic citizens an understanding of themselves in which their interests and fates are inexorably intertwined and mutually constituted (1990: 156-157). Pericles’ instruction, Kagan maintains, is one in civic virtue, a lesson that self-interest is unintelligible outside of a well-ordered political community.
Kagan’s tribute to the centrality of Periclean vision cuts against his insistence on the characteristic, almost easy, moderation of the Athenian demos and his critique of Thucydides’ stark distinction between Periclean and post-Periclean Athens. Leadership and statesmanship still figure centrally in his account of the Peloponnesian War, including his judgments about how Nicias’ incompetent leadership doomed the Athenians. Kagan’s rendering of Periclean exceptionalism seems to come at the expense of his vision of democratic prudence. For Pericles’ vision is required not only to sustain the self-understanding required for cohesion, commitment, and collective action. It also constitutes a response to the limits of democratic rationality. The tenuousness of prudence reveals itself in Kagan’s message to leaders of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, who -- like Pericles – ‘must restrain the people’s passions, moderate their anger and ambition, and persuade them to be sober, if not rational’ (1990: 10). Kagan’s account of Pericles’ artful and visionary leadership, embodied in the Funeral Oration, presupposes a popular temper and inclinations at odds with his expressed confidence elsewhere in democracy’s capacity for moderation and prudence.
It begins to make sense, however, once we recognize how Kagan’s laudatory account of Periclean leadership and Athenian democracy constitutes a response to his diagnosis of democracy’s shortcomings. His democratic exceptionalism supplies a solution to democratic irresolution, most obviously as a wellspring for the corporate identity prerequisite to any common endeavor. As democratic vision nurtures resolve so does Kagan’s narrative of the Peloponnesian War. It achieves this effect by offering a substantive and affective education in democratic prudence. A careful reading of the History teaches democratic actors what constitutes sensible statecraft, including how to wage war and when not to sue for peace. Prudence, the narrative reveals, might require an offensive posture, certainly not Pericles’ counterproductive moderation or Nicias’ destructive timidity. Affectively, Kagan’s narrative bolsters democratic confidence. His vision of Athens – eminently capable of reason and moderation but also astute enough to adopt more aggressive policies when circumstances require – has the effect of mollifying democratic misgivings, ameliorating what he sees as the incapacitating self-doubt of the American public. Here the relevance of ancient Athens to modern democracy trades on their actual difference: the Greeks had no qualms about exercising power over others. Kagan’s hope is to persuade modern liberal democracy to see itself as democratic Athens and to adopt its resolution. To do so, he has to first make Athens look more like modern liberal democracy, disarming the public’s pervasive fears about moral corruption and imperial impulse. Hence the significance of showing that the Athenians were hardly ‘expansionists without limits’ and of countering the prejudice that ‘democracy [entertains] absurdly bloated goals’ (2009: 47, 196). As Kagan’s incisive rendering of Pericles’ Funeral Oration suggests, there is much at stake in Athens’ image. And the reason is that democratic success, far from guaranteed, hinges on democratic self-understanding.
Hanson’s faith in democratic efficacy is equally questionable. His own concession that Sparta rather than Athens ‘produced the better military minds,’ which proved decisive at Sicily and Aegospotami, severs their ostensibly inexorable connection. Democratic Athens engendered ‘timid dullards’ (Nicias), ‘reckless entrepreneurs’ (Cleon, Alcibiades, Demosthenes), and generals infamous only for their death (Hippocrates, Laches). If Hanson said no more, the admission would reveal only the contingent relationship between military performance and constitutional form. But Hanson goes further, positing that Athenian democracy actually undermined its military effectiveness. It was the ‘intrusion of the assembly into military decision making’ that accounted for the poor quality of its leadership’ (2005: 307). The assembly’s oversight of its generals destroyed the capacity for strategic and tactical action required to win military engagements. 
Two distinct voices surface in Hanson’s writings, and they espouse competing accounts of the effects of democratic institutions on the ability to wield power. There is, as I have argued, an ardent and resounding democratic exceptionalism. There is also the clarion call of a deep-seated pessimism, pronouncing on the political dangers of democratic disagreement and civilian oversight over military policy. Such apprehensions dog Hanson’s reading of the Peloponnesian War, Vietnam, and Iraq. In the case of Athens, the power of the assembly to dictate military policy and punish its generals, he asserts, made them privilege domestic politics and therefore ‘too cautious or reckless’ in their military judgments (2005: 311-312). A similar preoccupation with the deleterious effects of democratic constraints on the conduct of warfare emerges from Hanson’s assessment of Vietnam: the American military lost because ‘it accommodated itself without imagination to the conditions of political audit and scrutiny that made it difficult to win’ (2001b: 8). 
In addition to criticizing the very civil-military relationship he considers responsible for democracy’s exceptional military performance, Hanson betrays profound doubts about democratic deliberation, dissent, and contestation. In his latest re-telling of the Peloponnesian War, and more prominently in his journalistic efforts, Hanson lets Thucydides voice his criticism of democracy. The Sicilian disaster demonstrates ‘what happens when folks at home do not support the troops abroad.’ Thucydides, he continues, believed that the ‘raucous assemblies, constant second-guessing, grand-standing, and hypercriticism severely hampered [Athenian] military operations’ (2005: 4, 311). This is clearly the lesson Hanson wants the American public to apply to Iraq, and the lesson he draws from Vietnam. Or is it?
The ambivalence in Hanson’s war narratives ultimately reaches a fever pitch. He reaffirms democratic institutions and the ethos of contestation, insisting that dissent is a ‘curious strength’ that can ‘seemingly weaken and actually empower.’ At the same time, he seems to deliver all the evidence to the contrary. The wars of the past and present, different as they are, illustrate the same thing: how democratic disunity, civilian constraints on military policy, and the ‘self-destructive political audit’ of the war functioned to ‘nullify’ American (and Athenian) power in ways the Vietnamese (and Spartan) army could not (2001b: 1, 9). Hanson’s account of Vietnam begins with Thucydides’ appraisal of the democratic disorders that guaranteed the Sicilian disaster and ends with his praise of democratic Syracuse’s ability to wage war.
What are we to make of this simultaneous espousal of contradictory claims? From the perspective of either, the other seems awfully strange. The upshot of Hanson’s account of the Sicilian Expedition and the Tet Offensive, both crucial to the eventual outcome of their respective wars, appears to be that democratic institutions undermine political success in wartime, that winning a war might require choosing against democracy. So given these negative assessments, why does Hanson cling to the notion that these very democratic institutions engender incomparable power and military efficacy? Conversely, if democratic systems engender unrivaled military prowess and overwhelming power, why bother cataloguing democratic deficiencies that only ‘seemingly weaken’? Why do Hanson’s polemics betray such contempt for the deliberative ethos and institutional checks and balances that are, in his view, the linchpins of democratic power?​[28]​ 
To make sense of this tension, we must recognize the performative and political function of Hanson’s account of democratic efficacy. Outside of his scholarly work, this argument features in An Autumn of War, a collection of wartime appeals to the Western public in the aftermath of 9/11. Here he reminds his reader that the history of ancient military practice unearths a legacy of democratic power, a ‘deadly form of warfare that transfers ideas of freedom, rationalism, consensual government, and egalitarianism to lethally trained civic militaries.’ The lesson of this history, Hanson avers, is that Americans have ‘little to fear from the Taliban and the terrorists,’ for democracy promises ‘ultimate victory’ (2002: xix).
If this reassurance sounds familiar, it is because it takes its cue from Pericles. Hanson’s claim about democratic efficacy is, for all intents and purposes, a rhetorical re-enactment of Pericles’ final speech to the dispirited Athenians, disillusioned by the plague and desirous of peace. Just as Pericles reveals to the Athenians the secret of their sea power, Hanson divulges the truth of Western preeminence to an American public ‘completely unaware of the vast extent of their nation’s military power’ (2001c: 5). The story of Athens is itself folded back into the Periclean attempt to counter democratic irresolution in response to the costs of war. Athens, whose exceptional resolve and audacity almost ‘nullified’ her mistakes, becomes part of the arsenal of democratic power (2005: 212).
The fact that Hanson’s account of democratic efficacy, called into question by his own rendering of the Peloponnesian and Vietnam wars, is a Periclean appeal suggests something about his views on democratic power. Contrary to the formal explanation given, Hanson’s inconsistencies indicate that democratic power does not inhere in constitutions; nor does it necessarily arise out of liberal democratic virtues. Instead, it stems from democracy’s conviction in its own exceptionalism. If the tenor and substance of Pericles’ final speech indicate that the power of Athens derived less from its material supremacy than from his rhetorical construction of it in both the Funeral Oration and in his later invocation of empire, the same goes for Hanson. Democratic power is only efficacious to the extent it is collectively believed. 
Beneath the assured vision of democratic exceptionalism central to Kagan’s and Hanson’s reception of Thucydides lies a more tenuous view of democracy’s prospects. This more anxious account, discernable in their observations on ancient Athens and modern liberal democracy, implicitly considers democratic statecraft a tall order, an oxymoron perhaps. It sees democracy’s fate as turning, not on brute power, but on intersubjective understandings and popular sensibilities. Democracy’s lack of resolution is thus a serious problem, one that finds a solution in democratic exceptionalism. The tensions in Kagan’s and Hanson’s readings reveal their full significance if we read their respective visions of democratic prudence and efficacy as replies to concerns about democratic performance. Kagan’s account of Athens, assuaging doubts about democracy’s moral status and rational capacities, instructs citizens in the art of prudence. Hanson’s instills democracy with a sense of its own power. Both embolden democratic confidence, countering modern democracy’s allegedly self-destructive penchant for self-doubt and withdrawal.

IV. Is the Thucydidean Cure Worse than the Democratic Disease?
The scope of this article precludes a comprehensive appraisal of Kagan’s and Hanson’s reception of Thucydides and their reading of contemporary politics. I will merely make a few critical observations about what I see as the main problems with answering concerns about democratic performance with an account of democratic virtues.
While bolstering democracy’s faith in its own prudence and power seems like a cogent response to irresolution, it risks swinging the pendulum in the other direction, towards arrogance and overconfidence. Consider the tone of Hanson’s reading of the History. Beyond emulating Pericles’ invocation of power, Hanson takes to heart his instruction to the Athenians to treat the enemy with contempt. His characterization of America’s foes, represented by Sparta, is derisive and scornful: the ‘cocky Spartans’ come from ‘a quasi police state’ with ‘no money, no walls, no lively intellectual life, no notion of upward mobility, and no immigration.’ ‘[O]ligarchic fundamentalists par excellence, hating ‘people power’ and the danger it represented,’ they started the war with a ‘preemptive strike into Attica’ (2005: 11-14, 22, 39). We would do well to think hard about Hanson’s performance of Periclean contempt given the Corinthian warning against the fatality of contempt (I.122.4) and the role it plays in the Athenian defeat at Syracuse (VI.104.3, VII.3.2). 
Kagan’s descriptions are, by contrast, muted and measured. Though less likely to fan the flames of contempt, his retelling of the Peloponnesian War risks breeding overconfidence all the same. His sanitized account of Pylos exemplifies why this might be so. Kagan does not merely amplify the strategic aspects of Athenian policy, the moments of skillful dexterity overshadowed by Thucydides’ ‘inordinate’ emphasis on chance (tychê). He extinguishes contingency altogether. Chance becomes calculated policy. The Messenian privateer who ‘happened to arrive’ with armaments and hoplites, no mere instance of good fortune, ‘must have been arranged in advance by Demosthemes.’ The ‘accidental’ forest fire started by Athenian soldiers at Sphacteria was certainly Demosthenes’ ‘deliberate emulation’ of the Aetolian strategy against his own troops the previous year, to be read as a sign of ‘learning’ rather than a ‘stroke of luck’ (2009: 124-126, 135).​[29]​ The distance between confidence and hubris can only be preserved by vigilant self-awareness. Kagan’s narration, which exaggerates the ease of strategic mastery and exorcises the unexpected, risks disabling Thucydides as a resource for such critical self-reflection.
 Kagan and Hanson seem to suggest that even the slightest reflexivity would prove incapacitating for liberal democracies at war. In this, they follow Pericles, not the Pericles who asserts the compatibility between reflection and deed (II.40.3), but the one who bars the admission of heralds (II.12.2) and refrains from calling the assembly into being (II.22.1). The Pericles who, holding to ‘the principle of no concession,’ inveighs against self-interrogation and discriminating between great and trivial causes (I.140.1-141.1). Thucydides’ praise for Pericles notwithstanding, the History brooks a more critical view.​[30]​ At a minimum, it suggests that rhetorical politics deployed to sustain democratic resolve abide by logics of their own. Pericles’ shifting rhetorical dynamics elucidate how the idioms and categories used to maintain popular support for war can call into being the very imperial entrapment that kills democracy (Lane 1995). 
Beyond undermining critical reflection, the democratic exceptionalism undergirding claims about democratic prudence and efficacy unwittingly justifies the instrumentalization of democracy. When democracy is appraised in terms of utility and power, it tends to find itself subordinated to both. For all of Hanson’s accolades, his admiration for democracy rests less on the virtues of collective wisdom and the merits of democratic practice than on its instrumental value. He extols ‘self-critique, civilian audit, and popular criticisms of military operations’ for the benefits they confer upon military efficacy, but is conspicuously silent on how they might be salutary for political decision-making. The intrinsic merits of liberal democratic institutions and practices remain vague, but their expedience is unassailable. In the case of Vietnam, Hanson notes that the dissent and contestation of an open society, despite having a deleterious impact on the war itself, had the ‘long-term effect of bulwarking… American credibility’ and fortifying its influence in the decades to come (2001b: 10). Democracy’s final appraisal, it seems, rests on the power that redounds from it. 	
Kagan’s and Hanson’s readings of politics and Thucydides privilege the necessities of statecraft over democratic politics.​[31]​ Geopolitical and psychological logics shape the environment democracies inhabit, taking precedence over their constitutional commitments and practices. The judgments and tasks crucial to democratic statecraft -- defining threats, ranking foreign policy priorities, adjudicating between domestic and foreign concerns, evaluating the conditions for peace or the reasons and methodology for warfare – are deduced from seemingly obvious strategic and psychological principles. They are not mediated by deliberation, disagreement, and contestation, the mainstays of any robust democratic process. This thin account of democracy is accompanied by a narrow conception of democratic survival, one insufficiently attentive to the preconditions for political community and coherent political action. Democratic survival requires more than will, resolve, and strategic acumen, and as many astute readers of the History have noted, imperial politics and the violent conflict it breeds threaten the integrity of democratic community and citizenship.​[32]​

V. Democratic Exceptionalism: Left, Right, and Center
Kagan and Hanson have done much to popularize Thucydides. Writing for general readers, they are alert to the contemporary political stakes of how the story of the Peloponnesian War is told (Kagan 1998; Hanson 2005). Their narratives, which constitute a potent form of political argumentation, feature an Athenian exceptionalism that is, paradoxically, animated by profound anxieties about modern democracy. I have focused on Kagan and Hanson because of their systematic engagements with Thucydides as well as their status as influential public intellectuals. Though their political commitments are controversial, it is important to stress that their substantive judgments on democracy are widely shared.
The congruence between how notable thinkers on the left and right read Thucydides is striking. Like Kagan, Moses Finley takes issue with Thucydides’ characterization of the Sicilian Expedition as the fruit of irrationality, ignorance, and heady demagogic orations. He, too, depicts reasoned, sustained and ‘intense discussion,’ citizens advised by ‘experts’ in ‘the Assembly,’ and the formalities of ‘debate and vote,’ defending Athenian democracy against elitist critics (Finley, 1973: 21-22, 33). Josiah Ober’s more recent defense of Athenian performance in the Archidamian War is also a reply to critics of democracy.​[33]​ As with Kagan, what he leaves out – for instance in his narration of Demosthenes’ plan to fortify Pylos – is as problematic as what he inserts. Ober is dissatisfied with Thucydides’ account, which attributes a brilliant strategic decision to impulse rather than knowledge and deliberation. He calls upon his reader to imagine more: ‘face-to-face discussions taking place around camp fires,’ democratic knowledge at work, a perfect ensemble of deliberation and daring (2010: 83). In his vision of democratic exceptionalism, Athens exhibits cool-headed efficiency and calculated fortitude. Irrationality, imprudence, and moral transgression fall out of the picture.
On the left and right, Athenian resilience and democratic exceptionalism prove to be common refrains in the contemporary reception of the ancient Greeks. General trends in empirical political science over the last twenty years suggest that this has more to do with anxieties about modern democracies than with Greek antiquity. Democratic exceptionalism, it turns out, has also been a salient theme in the non-partisan world of quantitative research. In 1992, David Lake published an article entitled ‘Powerful pacifists: democratic states and war.’ Lake argued that democracies were less likely to wage war against each other, but also more likely to win against autocratic states. This observation heralded the birth of the democratic peace and democratic efficacy research agenda. Ten years later, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam published their findings on the phenomena of democratic efficacy in a book called Democracies at War. Their quantitative analyses showed that democracies from 1816 to 1987 won almost all of the wars they initiated, for which they offered two hypotheses. Firstly, democratic leaders select themselves into winnable conflicts given the electoral costs of losing and a competitive marketplace place of ideas that encourages cautious and informed decision-making. Secondly, democratic culture produces better soldiers who fight with greater initiative. To put it concisely, democracies are more prudent, and they wage war more effectively. These selfsame truths are precisely those considered the legacy of fifth-century Athens. They, too, are animated by realist concerns about liberal democracy’s inability to compete against authoritarian regimes.​[34]​ 
The convergence between empirical political science research on democracy and historical accounts of classical Athens is worrisome for two reasons. It marks a reluctance to acknowledge the invariable tensions and tradeoffs between democracy, on the one hand, and cherished but competing values on the other, whether it be prudential foreign policy, political power, military effectiveness, social cohesion, or moral politics. To the degree that democratic peace and efficacy research, along with the democratic exceptionalism immanent in readings of Thucydides, reflect attempts to square democracy with every other value from peace to power, they discourage us from thinking through their invariably complex interrelations. The notion that all good things go together can only occlude the difficult choices and sacrifices that come from choosing against some goods in order to preserve others.  
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^1	  The following authors connect their interest in Thucydides to their own personal experience in warfare or reactions to an ongoing war: Abbott (1925), Connor (1984), Crane (1998), Dewald (2005), Halle (1955), Lane (2005), Lord (1945), Murray (1920), Tritle (2000, 2010).
^2	  In addition to Donald Kagan and Victor Hanson, Michael Palmer (1992) and Perez Zagorin (2005) intentionally write for a general audience.
^3	  Palmer (1992: 13). Palmer is borrowing from Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy advisor, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.
^4	  One idiosyncratic example is McCann and Strauss (2001), a comparative study of the Peloponnesian and Korean wars. The introduction to this edited volume contains a particularly lucid adumbration of how each conflict constitutes a respective test - and indictment - of ancient and modern democracy.
^5	  For a critical overview of the modern reception of Athenian democracy, see Roberts (1997) and Saxonhouse (1996, Chapter 1).
^6	  To get a sense of Kagan and Hanson as public intellectuals, see victorhanson.com and http://www.neh.gov/about/awards/jefferson-lecture/donald-kagan-biography. As well-known conservative commentators, Kagan and Hanson have published books, essays, editorials, and given copious interviews on domestic politics and American foreign and defense policy. Kagan has written extensively on post-Cold War Western complacency, and Hanson on post-9/11 dissent against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. See especially Kagan and Kagan (2000) and Hanson (2002). Over the years, their ideas and works have elicited praise from policymakers and won them numerous awards, including the National Humanities Medal. For evidence of Kagan’s influence as a mentor and teacher, see George (1993: 100), Hamilton (1990: 1505) and Hamilton and Krentz (1997). Kagan’s and Hanson’s monographs have elicited a broad range of responses, from critical scepticism to enthusiastic praise. Kagan’s less scholarly works have been subject to criticism, and he has occasionally been reprimanded for bringing modern categories and concerns to bear upon ancient history. See Gruen (1971), Stroud (1971), Cargill (1983), Grafton (2009), Mendelsohn (2004), Sealey (1981), Watt (1997). Nevertheless, he is widely praised for his skill as a historian and for his provocative scholarship. On his four-volume history, see Immerwahr (1970), McGregor (1976), Roebuck (1976), Westlake (1971), Crist (1989), Yunis (1990). For a representative sample of how his recent monographs have been received, see Beard (2010), Flory (2004), Grafton (2009), Grayling (2009), Rood (2009). Critics have been less generous with Hanson, who has persistently been taken to task for claiming a legacy of Western values and practices that runs from ancient Greece to modern America and Europe. For exemplary critical reviews, see Connolly (1998) Martindale (1999), Willett (2002). While some reviewers have recognized Hanson’s The Western Way of War as a path-breaking work and applauded his treatment of hoplite warfare, critics have also been skeptical of his thesis that decisive battle is an exclusively Greek legacy. See Lazenby (1992), Wheeler (1990), and Willett (2002).                        
^7	  Kagan’s and Hanson’s works are regularly reviewed in major newspapers and magazines. The New Yorker’s George Steiner (1991) wrote: ‘The temptation to acclaim Kagan’s four volumes as the foremost work of history produced in North America in this century is vivid.’ It can only be resisted, he goes on to say, for unfair literary reasons. Random House reportedly paid Hanson an advance of half a million dollars to write A War Like No Other, and his previous book, Why the West Has Won, was a New York Times bestseller. See Wheeler (2006).
^8	  See Hanson and Heath (1998), Hanson, Heath, Thornton (2001), Hanson (2002/2003), Kagan (2005), and Kaminski’s recent interview with Kagan (2013).
^9	  As footnote 1 indicates, war-related crises have facilitated many a return to Thucydides and the ancient Greeks on the presumption that their experiences contain lessons for modern Western democracies. On Cold War reception in particular, see Roberts (1994: Chapter 13) and Connor (1994).
^10	  Kagan’s and Hanson’s belief that the example of Athens can inspire modern liberal democrats is anticipated by Grote, Mill, and – in the 20th century – George Marshall, Louis Halle, Alfred Zimmern, and M.I. Finley. Their work is also part of a resurgence of scholarly interest in Athenian democracy since the mid-1980s. See Roberts (1994: 298-302).
^11	  For more on the relationship between political context and reception of Thucydides, see Connor (1997), Greenwood (2006: 14), and Tritle (2006).
^12	  As for Thucydidean reception, my focus on political discourse bears on the original text. The relationship between the speech of contemporary readers and the speech of Thucydides and his characters, at the very least, calls for renewed consideration of the History’s rhetorical politics and its significance for democracy. Four very different treatments of Thucydides touch upon the problems of rhetoric and speech, political education, and democracy: Euben 1977, Farrar 1989, Yunis 1996, Zumbrunnen 2008. For more on the significance of how Thucydides’ speech is construed by contemporary political theorists, see Lee (2014).
^13	  See footnote 6. In his review of Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, Oswyn Murray (1991) surmised that Kagan’s uncritical portrayal of Athenian democracy revealed more about modern America than ancient Athens, provocatively asking: ‘What new imperialism is currently being prepared on the playing-fields of Yale?’ In the aftermath of 9/11, Daniel Mendelsohn (2004) illuminated how Kagan’s and Hanson’s exegeses flatten out the crucial moral and tragic dimensions of the History that make it difficult to deploy the text in defense of imperialist projects. Mendelsohn’s analysis does not touch on the place or implications of their readings for democracy. Euben’s (2010) critical appraisal of Hanson’s appropriation contains a brief consideration of the character and limits of his vision of democracy.
^14	  The first, published in 2003, is simply entitled The Peloponnesian War. The material for both works comes from Kagan’s four-volume account of the war, whose writing spans the Cold War.
^15	  See Chapter 1 and the Conclusion of Kagan (2009). The argument that Thucydides is the first revisionist historian is taken from an earlier piece, Kagan (1998), with that very title.
^16	  All the actions that might constitute evidence of Athenian bellicosity and imperial aspiration – its founding of the Pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii; its preemptive ultimatum to the Potideaens to raze their walls, dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and give hostages; the infamous Megarian Decree – Kagan interprets as attempts to signal benign intentions and a serious commitment to peace. Accordingly, the Pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii indicated Athens’ lack of imperial ambition. Likewise, Athens’ unprovoked but provocative measures constituted ‘a middle path’ between fatal inaction and outright violation of the Thirty Years’ Peace. Cf. Kagan (2009: 47-63) and Kagan (2003: 20-40). In anachronistic terms, Athens pursued a cautious policy of strategic deterrence designed to preserve its alliance and to contain the conflict with Corinth. Kagan’s position is consistent over time. Kagan (1969: 291) rebuts the caricature of Athens offered in the Corinthian speech in I.70, calling Athenian policy since 445 ‘a model of restraint,’ which ‘arose inevitably from the institutions and character of the Athenian people.’ In Kagan (1990: 65), he objects to ‘Plato’s misrepresentation of Athenian democracy,’ insisting that throughout war and stasis, ‘Athenian democracy persisted and showed a restraint and moderation rarely equaled by any regime.’
^17	  Kagan (2009: 78, 85-86, 120-121). Importantly, Kagan (2003: 113, 157) argues that ‘[e]ven the moderates felt the need to take the offensive’ and that the more daring policies in succeeding years ‘did not so much reflect a change in the alignment of generals but rather the fact that, encouraged by their recent victories, the majority of Athenians were now ready to pursue a more militant strategy.’
^18	  Cf. Kagan (1974: 232-238, 258-259).
^19	  Cf. Kagan (1974: 239-244).
^20	  Cf. Kagan (1974: 182-186), Kagan (1981: 164-191, 362-365).
^21	  Kagan (2009: 161), Kagan (1981: 184). Though Kagan is not enamored of Alcibiades. See Kagan (1987: 419-420) and Kagan (2003: 447).
^22	  Kagan (1987: 419).
^23	  Euben (2010) provides a nuanced analysis and critique of Hanson’s appropriation of Thucydides.
^24	  In North America, the book is entitled Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. Hanson’s argument is informed by an earlier monograph, The Western Way of War (1989).
^25	  Hanson (2001c: 6). In this speech, Brasidas exhorts his troops to maintain their courage in the face of an upcoming battle against what appears to be a formidable enemy. Hanson presents Brasidas as dismissing the actual strength of their foes, the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus, because these ‘savage opponents’ and barbarian tribes are ‘the product of cultures “in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many” (Thucydides 4.126).’ Brasidas, however, is speaking to the Spartans about themselves to assuage their fears about being outnumbered after being deserted by the Macedonians: ‘The bravery that you habitually display in war does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else than to superiority in the field.’ Hanson willfully misrepresents Brasidas (and Thucydides) as a mouthpiece for the ostensibly ancient wisdom that ‘connects military discipline, fighting in rank, and the preference for shock battle with the existence of popular and consensual government.’ 
^26	  A number of reviewers have taken Kagan to task for being too uncritically sanguine about Athenian democracy. See Orwin (1993: 161), Murray (1991), Saxonhouse (1993: 489).
^27	  Kagan observes that in the absence of Pericles’ ‘firm hand’ on policy and without his ability ‘to inspire and moderate the Athenian people,’ ‘the Athenians experienced the inconveniences inherent in the truly democratic management of a state in time of war’ (2003: 87).
^28	  Hanson deploys ‘the old hard-as-nails veteran Thucydides’ in his populist polemics, deriding effete elites who settle arguments by ‘committee and consultation.’ See Hanson (2002: 93-94).
^29	  Cf. Kagan (2003: 138-152).
^30	  See, for instance, Monoson and Loriaux (1998), Mara (2008), Orwin (1994), Foster (2010), Taylor (2010).
^31	  Consider, for instance, Kagan’s laudatory depiction of Thrasybulus as a ‘moderate’ who ‘put victory in the war as the highest priority, even if it meant compromises had to be made in the popular democracy of Athens’ (2003: 366).
^32	  Notable works attuned to the threat of political disintegration and the fate of democratic community and citizenship include Euben (1990), White (1984), Strauss (1964), Orwin (1994), Forde (1989), Lane (2005), Cohen (2006), Murray (1920), Tritle (2000, 2010), Shay (1994). 
^33	  Ober’s most systematic case for the epistemic advantages of democracy, which relies on Athenian democracy, is laid out in Democracy and Knowledge (2008).
^34	  In their response to the criticisms of realist scholar, Michael Desch, Reiter and Stam note that the phenomenon of democratic efficacy ‘confounds the traditional realpolitik fear that democratic liberalism is a luxury that states may be unable to afford.’ See Desch (2002) and Reiter and Stam (2003: 168). Desch begins his case against what he calls the ‘democratic triumphalists’ by invoking Thucydides’ History as ‘the classic indictment of the inability of democracies to prepare for and fight wars’ (2002: 5).
^35	  See Downes (2009), Reiter, Stam, and Downes (2009). Downes disaggregates war outcome into win, lose, or draw and war participants into initiators, targets, and joiners. The original empirical analysis only divided the data using the first two categories for each variable.
